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Abstract—DNA origami is a method used to program the self-
assembly of nanoscale computational systems. The contribution
of this paper is to probe the security of a canonical DNA origami
that is often reused. The paper describes the techniques we
used to design probes whose input targets the origami systems’
integrity. Experimental results show that the probes successfully
caused up to a third of the systems to fail. Moreover, our
approach identified a single, small input whose addition was able
to cause the failure of a quarter of the systems. Extending such
probes to other DNA origami systems may aid in understanding
how to enhance their reliability.
I. Introduction
DNA origami, developed by Rothemund, is a method
whereby DNA molecules can be programmed to autonomously
self-assemble into a nanosystem with the required shape and
algorithmic behavior [8]. Applications include bio-compatible
devices, nano-electronics, and nano-robots [9], [6]. Since many
applications are medical or critical, they must be reliable
[7], [5]. In previous work we have analyzed safe designs for
molecular programmed systems [2]. In this paper we describe
results from an initial study of the security of DNA origami.
We designed security probes to investigate the following two
research questions: RQ1: To what extent can a small alteration
of the input damage the integrity of the origami self-assembly,
i.e., let the output be improperly altered [4]? This asks whether
corrupting the input can cause the resulting DNA origami to
fail to self-assemble into the correct system. RQ2: Can we
identify a minimal “bad” input and a sufficient quantity at
which its presence successfully attacks the integrity of the
origami? By “minimal” we mean a single, short DNA strand.
Results from execution of the first set of implemented
probes answered RQ1 in the affirmative. The probes attacked
the target DNA origami using carefully selected, minimal
perturbations of the input (replacing two short DNA strands
with a different short DNA strand). This attack caused the
original 5-pointed star to self-assemble into a distorted, 4-
pointed star with the fifth arm folded over (e.g., into the middle
of the star) in up to 36% of the systems.
Results from execution of the second set of implemented
probes answered RQ2 in the affirmative. The probes attacked
the star using varying relative concentrations of “good” and
“bad” input. The “bad” input thus serves as an intrusion. The
probes showed that a ratio of 1:3, respectively, caused the star
to fail to assemble correctly but to instead self-assemble into
a distorted star with one arm folded over.
In probing the security of the DNA origami we were able
to identify, implement in DNA, and experimentally execute
attacks in which the introduction of a fairly low quantity of
a single “bad” DNA short strand caused the failure of the
integrity of approximately a third of the systems.
II. Approach
This section provides brief background information, then
describes the development process by which the control star
and the probes were created and how results were evaluated.
Background. In DNA origami a long strand of single-
stranded DNA, called a scaffold, is folded into a desired shape
by many short strands of DNA, called staples. The staples
are selected to bind the folds into place. Programming to
achieve the intended system thus occurs by means of the
choice and relative quantities (i.e., concentrations) of DNA
staples to be mixed in solution with the scaffold. The well-
mixed solution is heated and then cooled in the laboratory
so that the DNA origami will self-assemble. On the order
of 25 billion origamis will self-assemble in a test tube, with
the percentage of correctly formed ones called the yield. The
systems are probabilistic, and many failures do occur.
Control. We selected the DNA origami, 5-pointed star
described by Rothemund in his seminal 2006 paper [8] as
the baseline (the “good” star) and implemented it in DNA.
Probes. The probes were the anomalous staple strands
designed to introduce errors in the star formation. The software
tools CaDNAno [1] and CANDO [3] were used to first design
the “good” star, then the outcome of each probe was simulated
using CANDO by substituting the respective correct staple
with the probe prior to implementing it in DNA.
Evaluation. We visualized the star origamis using an Atomic
Force Microscope (AFM). Ten unique images were collected
via atomic force microscopy of each sample and a population
analysis was performed by counting individual star objects in
the images. Figure 1 is an AFM image from one probe sample,
FS4, showing many stars clearly folded.
III. Results
RQ1. To investigate RQ1, we designed, implemented in
DNA, and performed four different probes of the star: causing
it to bind the left arm to the middle of the star (FS1), the
top arm to the middle of the star (FS2), the bottom arm to
the middle of the star (FS3), and the top arm to the bottom
of the star (FS4). Each of these attacks involved deleting two
Fig. 1: AFM image of probe results on star FS4
inputs–a staple in a single arm and a staple in the middle of
the star–and adding a single, anomalous staple.
Fig. 2 shows the results from this first set of probes. A
“folded” star is a system that was successfully attacked in
that an arm folded inwards to bind to the middle of the star.
An “incorrect” star is a system that failed to self-assemble into
a shape. The attacks on the star were relatively successful. For
FS4 the folded stars (36%) exceeded both the normal (32%)
and the incorrect ones (32%).
RQ2. The second question refers to how readily we can
disrupt the self-assembly into the correct system. We probed
this by determining how much it “costs” to successfully attack
it, i.e., what proportion of anomalous staples to correct staples
do we have to input to cause the star to fold?
To answer this question, we performed a second set of
probes in which we varied the relative concentrations of the
correct input and the corrupt input (the anomalous staple strand
that was added). These were run with the concentration of the
anomalous staple equal, double, triple, quadruple, one-half,
one-third, and one-fourth the concentration of the two regular
staples. The Control has only correct input.
Fig. 3 summarizes results from this second set of probes.
The most successful attack was with the concentration of
anomalous staples to regular staples in a 3:1 ratio. At that
point 25% of the stars folded, i.e., failed to self-assemble
correctly. While the percentage of incorrect stars (i.e., blobs)
remains fairly constant across the probes, the number of folded
stars grows rapidly with increased concentration. A higher
proportion of anomalous staples created a higher fraction of
folded (i.e., failed) stars from equal to double to triple. We
would expect this to be true only up to a saturation point; the
table seems to indicate that this point was then reached.
IV. Conclusion
Results from our probing of the security of a canonical DNA
origami show that the introduction of a single, potentially ma-
licious input successfully disrupted the star’s integrity, causing
Fig. 2: Yields of RQ1 probes: successful attack caused 36%
of stars to fold. Y-axis is % of stars.
Fig. 3: Yields of RQ2 probes: 3:1 ratio of a single “bad” staple
to “good” staples caused 25% of stars to fold.
failure of the required output in over a third of the systems. The
planned uses of DNA origami for medical diagnostics and bio-
compatible materials will often require high reliability, e.g., for
certification. The results reported here suggest that extending
the use of security probes to other DNA origami systems could
help improve our understanding of some risks to reliability for
these systems and of how such risks might be mitigated.
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